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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Petitioner, : Case No. 
v. : 
LEON EARL DENNEY, : Category No. 2 
Defendant-Respondent. : 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI 
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Whether the Utah Court of Appeals rendered a decision 
so far departing from the accepted and usual course of judicial 
proceedings as to call for an exercise of this Court's power of 
supervision, when the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's 
denial of defendant's motion nunc pro tunc terminating probation 
after a statutory eighteen month period: 
1. holding that the "unequivocal" sentencing order did 
not state that defendant's three year sentence of probation was 
actually two consecutive eighteen month terms notwithstanding the 
trial court's intent, when in fact the order was ambiguous as 
directly contrary to law and intent should have been considered, 
and, 
2. prior to reversal, the Court of Appeals did not, as 
required, address whether defendant either waived his statutory 
right to termination of probation after eighteen months, or 
otherwise should have been estopped from attacking the trial 
court's decision. 
OPINION BELOW 
State v. Penney, slip op. No. 880371-CA (June 14, 1989, 
Utah Ct. of App.). (See Addendum A.) 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This petition is from an opinion of the Utah Court of 
Appeals filed June 14, 1989, reversing the trial court's denial 
of defendant's motion nunc pro tunc terminating probation after a 
statutory eighteen month period. This Court has jurisdiction to 
consider this petition pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(a) 
(1987) (Supp. 1989). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
For purposes of this brief, appellant relies on: 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (1982) (Supp. 1986). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 18, 1985, defendant, Leon Earl Denney, 
pled guilty to two third degree felony offenses of Uttering a 
Forged Prescription, in the Fifth Judicial District Court of Iron 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Robert F. Owens, Associated 
District Judge, sitting by appointment, presiding (R. at 14-16). 
Defendant was sentenced by the Honorable J. Philip Eves, 
Associated District Judge, sitting by appointment, on March 20, 
1986 to two concurrent terms of zero to five years at the Utah 
State Penitentiary (R. at 40-46). At defendant's request, by and 
through his attorney, the execution of his prison term was 
suspended or stayed and he was placed on probation for a period 
of three years (two consecutive eighteen month terms) (R. at 26, 
40-46). 
On April 12, 1988, during defendant's continuing 
probation, Judge Eves issued an Order to Show Cause, ordering 
defendant to appear and show cause why his probation should not 
be revoked on the allegations that defendant had violated his 
probation agreement (R. at 62-65). 
On April 28, 1988, defendant moved the court nunc pro 
tunc to terminate his probation following eighteen months of 
alleged incident-free probation (R. at 67). 
On May 17, 1988, following a hearing on defendant's 
motion to terminate probation nunc pro tunc, the motion was 
denied (R. at 75). Also on May 17, 1988, the Order to Show Cause 
Hearing was held. Following the hearing, defendant's probation 
was revoked and the original concurrent sentences of zero to five 
years were imposed, upon a finding by the court that defendant 
had violated the specific terms of his probation agreement (R. 
77-79). 
On June 14, 1989, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed 
the trial court's denial of defendant's motion nunc pro tunc. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On March 20, 1986, after pleading guilty to two counts 
of Uttering a Forged Prescription, defendant was sentenced to 
serve two concurrent terms of zero to five yeats dl the Utah 
State Penitentiary by the Honorable J. Philip Eves, sitting as 
District Judge by assignment (Transcript of the Sentencing 
Hearing held March 19, 1986 [hereinafter T.3/19/86] at 41). 
After a lengthy hearing at which defendant and his 
counsel argued strenuously against commitment to prison, Judge 
Eves suspended or stayed the execution of the prison term. At 
the express request of defendant through his counsel (See Defense 
Counsel's Recommendation, R. at 26, and attached as Addendum B), 
defendant was placed on an extended term of three years probation 
under the intensive supervision of Adult Probation and Parole 
(T.3/19/86 at 41). The three year term of probation was a 
combination of two eighteen-month probationary terms upon 
conviction of two third degree felony offenses, running 
consecutively (Transcript of Hearing on Motion to Terminate 
Probation held May 17, 1988 [hereinafter T.5/17/88] at 6). The 
granting of probation was contingent upon defendant's compliance 
with the terms of his probation agreement, which defendant 
indicated that he understood (T.3/19/86 at 41-43). 
On April 12, 1988, during defendant's continuing 
probation, Judge Eves issued an Order to Show Cause, ordering 
defendant to appear and show cause why his probation should not 
be revoked on the allegations that defendant had been arrested 
for Driving Under the Influence in the State of Nevada, and that 
defendant had committed credit card fraud (See copy of the 
allegations of the Order to Show Cause, R. at 62-65, and attached 
as Addendum C). 
On April 28, 1988, defendant moved the court nunc pro 
tunc to terminate his probation following eighteen months of 
alleged incident-free probation (R. at 67). On May 17, 1988, 
following a hearing on defendant's motion to terminate probation 
nunc pro tunc, the motion was denied (R. «i I 75). At the hearing, 
Judge Eves indicated that defendant's original probationary 
sentence was two consecutive eighteen month terms totaling three 
years (R. at 6-7). 
Also on May 17, 1988, the Order to Show Cause Hearing 
was held (See Transcript of the Order to Show Cause Hearing held 
May 17, 1988 [hereinafter T. OSC 5/17/88]). Following the 
hearing, defendant's probation was revoked and the original 
concurrent sentences of zero to five years were imposed, upon a 
finding by the court that defendant had consumed alcohol and had 
been convicted of driving under the influence (T. OSC 5/17/88 at 
7), and had knowingly furnished false information to obtain a 
credit card; each of which was in violation of the specific terms 
of defendant's probation agreement (T. OSC 5/17/88 at 37). 
On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed the trial 
court's denial of defendant's motion nunc pro tunc terminating 
his probation after eighteen months. State v. Penney, slip op. 
No. 880371-CA, at 5 (June 14, 1989, Utah Ct. of App.). The Court 
found that the sentencing order: 
as written and pronounced, sentenced the 
defendant to three years probation. The 
judge did not state in his order that the 
term of three years was actually two 
consecutive terms of eighteen months each. 
Although, [sic] the judge may have intended 
the terms to run consecutively, we do not 
examine his intent where the written order is 
unequivocal. 
Id. nf 4. The Court also indicated that "because the term of 
probation automatically terminated after eighteen months
 ( ii did 
not reach the merits of the State's argument of waiver and 
estoppel. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
This Court should grant certiorari to review the Court 
of Appeals decision because that court erred in its decision that 
the probation order originally imposed in this case was 
unambiguous. The Court of Appeals erred in determining that the 
automatic probation termination provisions were applicable in 
this matter. 
The Court of Appeals also erred in not addressing the 
issues of waiver and estoppel raised by the State which precluded 
an automatic termination of probation. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE SENTENCING ORDER BY THE TRIAL COURT WAS 
AMBIGUOUS, AND THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY 
NOT CONSIDERING THE ENTIRE RECORD TO DETERMINE 
THE TRIAL COURT'S INTENT IN SENTENCING DEFENDANT. 
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's denial 
of defendant's motion nunc pro tunc terminating probation, 
concluding that the "judge did not state in his order that the 
term of three years was actually two consecutive terms of 
eighteen months each", and since the order was "unequivocal" the 
order "cannot be varied by remarks made in a later hearing to 
coincide with what the judge may have intended." State v. 
Penney, slip op. No. 880371-CA, at 4 (June 14, 1989, Utah Ct. of 
App.). 
Such a characterization of the sentencing order was 
erroneous, for the order contained an obvious latent ambiguity, 
and the Court of Appeals should have properly relied upon other 
parts of the record to determine the intent of the trial court. 
At the time defendant was originally sentenced, Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a) (1982) (Supp. 1986) provided, "[u]pon 
completion without violation of 18 months probation in felony or 
class A misdemeanor cases, . . . the offender shall be terminated 
from sentence, unless the person is earlier terminated by the 
court." In the present case the trial court order provided "IT 
IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, Leon Earl Denney, be placed 
on probation for a period of three (3) years from and after March 
20, 1986" (R. at 41). The plain language of the sentencing 
order, without evidence of the trial court's intention (i.e. 
consecutive probationary terms), cannot be read consistently with 
the statute, and would be ambiguous to those who are required to 
enforce the judgment. The sentencing order on its face appears 
not to be ambiguous, but a latent ambiguity clearly arose 
This provision was amended effective April 24, 1989 and now 
provides: 
Probation may be terminated at any time at 
the discretion of the court or upon 
completion without violation of 36 months 
probation in felony or Class A misdemeanor 
cases, or 12 months in cases of Class B or C 
misdemeanors or infractions. If the 
defendant, upon expiration or termination oi 
the probationary period, had outstanding 
fines or restitution owing, the court may 
retain jurisdiction of the case and continue 
the defendant on bench probation or place the 
defendant on bench probation for a limited 
purpose of enforcing the payment of fines and 
restitution. Upon motion of the prosecutor 
or victim, or upon its own motion, the court 
may require the defendant to show cause why 
his failure to pay should not be treated as 
contempt of court or why the suspended jail 
or prison term should not be imposed. 
Utah Code Ann. $ 77-18-l(7)(a) (1982) (Supp. 1989). 
eighteen months after the probation went into effect. During 
enforcement of the second probationary term, without evidence of 
the trial court's intention, the order was contrary to S 77-18-
l(10)(a).2 
As noted by the Court of Appeals, the court in State v. 
Garcia, 659 P.2d 918 (N.M. App. 1983) held: 
Where the language of a judgment is clear and 
unambiguous, it must be given effect as it is 
written, Parks v. Parks, 91 N.M. 369, 574 
P.2d 588 (1978); however, when the meaning is 
ambiguous, the other documents of record may 
be resorted to for purposes of construing the 
meaning of the judgment. 
Id. at 923 (emphasis added). See also Rinehart v. State, 234 
N.W.2d 649, 656 (Iowa 1975)("A decree is to be construed like 
other written instruments; the determining factor is the 
This Court's decision in State v. Green, 757 P.2d 465 (Utah 
1988), is distinguishable from the present case, and is not 
controlling. In Green, this Court held that a defendant's 
probation could not be revoked in a revocation proceeding 
initiated after the statutory probation term under $77-18-
1(10) (a) had expired. In the present case, unlike Green, 
revocation proceedings were initiated during the continuing 
probation of defendant in his second term of the consecutive 
probationary sentence. As required by former S 77-18-1(10)(a), 
defendant's first term of probation "terminated" after eighteen 
months. Simultaneously, defendant's second term of probation 
began, during which time defendant's probation was properly 
revoked. The issue here is not whether Green is controlling, but 
whether consecutive probationary periods are valid under state 
law. The Court of Appeals did not reach this issue. See State 
v. Denney, slip op. No. 880371-CA, at 4 (June 14, 1989, Utah Ct. 
of App.). Unlike Green, wherein the State argued that a 
probation violation -tolled" the probationary period, the State 
is now arguing that the violation occurred during a second, 
consecutive probationary term. 
Green is also distinguishable because it involved a single 
probationary term for a single criminal conviction. In the 
present case, defendant was convicted of two criminal charges and 
given two consecutive probationary terms. 
intention of the court as gathered from all parts of the 
judgment"). 
The Court of Appeals conceded, "after reviewing the 
record, it appears that the trial court may have intended to 
sentence defendant to two consecutive terms of probation lasting 
eighteen months each." See State v. Penney, slip op. No. 880371-
CA, at 3 (June 14, 1989, Utah Ct. of App.). As the Court 
recognized, such intention can be established from the record, 
which includes the statement of Judge Eves (who originally 
sentenced defendant) at the hearing to terminate defendant's 
probation, that "[a]t the time the probation was imposed, the 
defendant had been convicted of two third degree felonies. The 
18 months' probation was imposed on each felony to run 
consecutively" 
(T.5/17/88 at 6). 
The sentencing order was less than "unequivocal", 
containing an obvious latent ambiguity. The Court of Appeals 
should have established the intention of the trial court by 
reliance on the entire record, and reached the merits of the 
efficacy of consecutive probationary periods. 
POINT II 
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED BY HOLDING THAT 
DEFENDANT'S PROBATION AUTOMATICALLY TERMINATED 
AFTER EIGHTEEN MONTHS, WITHOUT FIRST 
ADDRESSING WHETHER DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT 
TO THE STATUTORY TERMINATION, AND/OR WHETHER 
HE SHOULD HAVE BEEN ESTOPPED FROM ATTACKING 
THE TRIAL COURT'S DECISION. 
The Court of Appeals, in holding that defendant's 
probation automatically terminated after eighteen months, failed 
to respond to the State's arguments of waiver and estoppel. 
The Court of Appeals should have responded to these 
issues prior to making its decision, and it was erroneous for the 
Court not to do so. The Court of Appeals could not have properly 
made a determination that defendant had a right to automatic 
probation termination after eighteen months, without first 
determining whether he had previously waived that right or should 
have been estopped from asserting that right. The State 
specifically argued that defendant explicitly or implicitly 
waived his right of probation termination after eighteen months 
and/or was estopped from asserting the right, when he 
specifically requested, through his counsel's sentencing 
recommendation, to be placed upon probation for three years (R. 
at 26, 40-46, see Addendum B). 
A. Waiver 
As a general proposition, rights granted by statute or 
by the State or Federal Constitution may be waived. See 28 
Am.Jur.2d § 163 (1966)(Supp. 1988); See also Singer v. United 
States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965); and Palmer v. Broadbent, 260 P.2d 581 
(Utah 1953) (person for whose benefit statutory provision was 
enacted may waive provision if rights of others are not 
affected). Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known 
right. See Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P.2d 430 (Utah 1983). Waiver 
has been found to have been made either expressly or by 
implication at many different stages of a criminal proceeding. 
See State v. Tuttle, 399 P.2d 580 (Utah 1965) (defendant's 
presentation of evidence to the jury, coupled with no prior 
motion to suppress, constituted a waiver of alleged illegal 
search and seizure of evidence); State v. Kelsey, 532 P.2d 1001 
(Utah 1975) (waiver of right to trial by jury may be made in a 
capital case); State v. Beck, 584 P.2d 870 (Utah 1978) (upon plea 
of guilty, defendant waived any claim of error by policeman in 
application for arrest warrant that defendant had been identified 
as murderer); State v. Sydall, 433 P.2d 10 (Utah 1967) (waiver of 
right to preliminary examination). 
There is evidence present in the record that, at the 
time of defendant's sentencing, he, through his attorney, 
expressly requested a three-year term of probation in lieu of a 
prison sentence (R. at 26). The trial court accepted the 
probationary term of three years as the combined two eighteen-
month terms for two third degree felony convictions, to be served 
consecutively (T.3/17/88 at 6). By requesting and stipulating to 
the three year term, defendant either explicitly or implicitly 
waived any right of probation terminating under former § 77-18-
1(10)(a) after eighteen months of violation-free probation. 
Because the waiver occurred prior to defendant's sentencing and 
before the conclusion of defendant's first eighteen month 
probation period, the Court of Appeals should have addressed 
whether this waiver affected his statutory right to termination 
of probation. The court erred by not doing so. 
It is clear on the record that defendant knew that the 
trial judge was strongly leaning toward sending him to prison 
(T.3/19/86 at 39). The sentencing record is replete with 
instances where defendant presented arguments which were 
obviously intended to persuade the court to allow him probation 
rather than to incarcerate him (T.3/19/86 at 17-20, 25-34). 
Granted, the recommendation found at page 26 of the Record is 
entitled "Defense Counsel's Recommendations", but defendant 
obviously agreed to the recommendation if it would keep him from 
being sent to prison. At the conclusion of the lengthy 
sentencing hearing, the trial court, on the record, placed 
defendant on probation for a period of three years under the 
provision of the intensive supervision program by the Department 
of Adult Probation and Parole (T.3/19/86 at 41). After 
enumerating the conditions of probation, the court addressed 
defendant asking if he had any questions or misunderstood any of 
the provisions of the sentence. To that, defendant answered "no" 
(T.3/19/86 at 43). At no time did defendant object to the 
imposition of a three year probation. By answering the court as 
defendant did, he waived his right to notice and hearing for 
purposes of modifying or extending probation under former § 77-
18-1 (10) or (12) (1982) (Supp. 1986).3 
Defendant's request to the trial court constituted an 
express waiver of his right to automatic termination of probation 
after eighteen months. Defendant stated that he understood the 
requirements for his probation. Whether this waiver came 
directly or through his attorney does not or should not affect 
the validity of the waiver. Defendant had the right to waive 
this statutory right and it was very beneficial to do so in light 
of the impending prison sentence. Therefore, the Court of 
These provisions of notice and hearing have since been 
amended and can now be found under Utah Code Ann. S 77-18-1(9) 
(1982) (Supp. 1989). 
Appeals should have properly determined the effect of defendant's 
waiver, prior to making its decision that defendant's probation 
automatically terminated after eighteen months. 
B. Estoppel 
The Utah Supreme Court held in State v. Aikers, 51 P.2d 
1052 (Utah 1935), that ". . .a party cannot assign as error a 
ruling which he has himself induced the court to make." I_d. at 
1058. If, in fact, the trial court was in error in sentencing 
defendant to three years probation upon his conviction for two 
third degree felonies, defendant should have been estopped from 
assigning as error that ruling, for it was he himself who 
requested and induced the court to make the ruling (R. at 26, see 
Addendum B). 
In Webster v. Jones, 587 P.2d 528 (Utah 1978), a 
plaintiff who had been convicted of drunk driving and placed on 
probation filed a habeas corpus petition to restrain a city court 
from revoking his probation after he was arrested for burglary. 
He claimed that the original conviction was defective because the 
city judge had found that he was not indigent and the judge would 
not appoint counsel for him. This Court held with regard to 
estoppel: 
. . . we think it should be discordant to any 
one's sense of fairness and justice, as it is 
our own, for a person to accept a judgment 
which places him on probation during good 
behavior, enjoy the benefits thereof until 
his misconduct justifies revocation of the 
probation, then attempt to revert back and 
attack the judgment. The principle of 
estoppel is not usually spoken of as applying 
in the criminal law, but the principle of 
fairness and good conscience pervades 
throughout the law, and this plaintiff, 
having enjoyed the benefit of the judgment so 
long as it favored him, should not in good 
conscience be allowed to turn about and 
complain thereof. 
Id. at 530-531. The situation in Webster and the situation in 
the present case are very much alike. As in Webster, defendant 
here received the benefit of being placed on probation, later 
violated that probation, and now seeks to attack the original 
term of probation after being found in violation of that 
probation. As indicated by this Court, a defendant should not be 
allowed in the name of fairness and justice to accept probation 
during good behavior, enjoy the benefits thereof, commit 
misconduct calling for a revocation of probation, then attack the 
previous ruling placing him on probation. 
As this Court in Webster indicated, estoppel is not 
usually spoken of as applying in the criminal law; nonetheless, 
the principle has been used in the courts of this state during 
criminal proceedings. See State v. Knill, 656 P.2d 1026 (Utah 
1982) (defendant waived preliminary hearing then asked for remand 
for a hearing to be held; on appeal he was estopped from 
objecting to the timeliness of the hearing); State v. Danks, 418 
P.2d 488 (Utah 1966) (defendant discharged retained and appointed 
counsel; he was precluded on appeal from complaining about lack 
of counsel); State v. Neal, 262 P.2d 756 (Utah 1953) (defendant 
filed a Notice of Appeal and then a Motion for a Rehearing of 
Motion for a New Trial; the motion was heard and denied. 
Defendant was precluded on appeal from claiming as error that the 
trial court lacked jurisdiction after the Notice of Appeal was 
filed). 
In the present case, defendant should be estopped from 
requesting an extended probation, enjoying the benefits thereof, 
then attacking that extended probation order when he violated his 
probation. The Court of Appeals erred by reversing without first 
addressing the issue of estoppel. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, petitioner respectfully 
requests that this Court grant the Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this /«*/^ day of July, 1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that four true and accurate copies of 
the foregoing Petition for Writ of Certiorari were mailed, 
postage prepaid, to James L. Shumate, attorney for defendant, 110 
North Main Street, Suite H, P.O. Box 623, Cedar City, Utah, 
84720, this / ^ day of July, 1989. 
ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
F I L E D 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOOO 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Leon Earl Denney, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
i 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 880371-CA 
Fifth District, Iron County 
The Honorable J* Philip Eves 
Attorneys: James L. Shumate, Cedar City, for Appellant 
R. Paul Van Dam, Charlene Barlow, Salt Lake City, 
for Respondent 
Before Judges Davidson, Garff, and Greenwood. 
DAVIDSON, Judge: 
Defendant appeals from the trial court's revocation of his 
probation. He claims that his probation term automatically 
terminated after eighteen months by operation of law pursuant 
to Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(10)(a) (Supp. 1986).1 We agree 
and reverse. 
Defendant pleaded guilty, on September 18, 1985, to two 
third degree felony charges of uttering a forged prescription 
under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(4)(a)(iii) (1985). On March 20 
1986, he was sentenced to two indeterminate sentences of sero 
to five years at the Utah State Prison. The trial court 
suspended the prison term and placed defendant on supervised 
probation for a term of three years. 
I* Utah Code Ann. § 77-18*1 was amended in 1985 and 1987. &££ 
1985 Utah Laws ch. 229, § 1; 1987 Utah Laws ch. 114, S 1. The 
provision defendant relies upon in this appeal is currently 
found in Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7)(a) (Supp. 1988). 
Defendant completed the first eighteen months of probation 
without incident. However, on March 25, 1988, he was arrested 
for violating the terms of his probation by allegedly 
committing credit card fraud and for driving under the 
influence. On April 12, 1988, the trial court ordered 
defendant to appear before the court and show cause why his 
probation should not be revoked. Defendant filed a motion to 
terminate probation nunc pro tunc. The court denied the 
motion, revoked defendantfs probation and imposed the original 
two consecutive sentences of zero to five years. 
Defendant argues on appeal that section 77-18-1(10)(a) 
mandated that his probation be terminated after eighteen months 
of incident-free probation. The state argues that it is within 
the trial court's discretion to sentence defendant to two 
consecutive terms of probation and that defendant waived his 
right to termination of probation by expressly requesting a 
three-year term of probation in lieu of a prison sentence. 
Section 77-18-1(10)(a) provided that •[u]pon completion 
without violation of 18 months probation in felony or class A 
misdemeanor cases, . . . the offender shall be terminated from 
sentence, unless the person is earlier terminated by the 
court.- In State v. Green. 757 P.2d 462 (Utah 1988), the Utah 
Supreme Court held that the term "shall* was a strong 
legislative mandate that required probation to terminate after 
eighteen months. "This strong mandate is not consistent with 
the State's position tnat the eighteen-month term is 'tolled' 
when any violation occurs within the period and that there is 
no time limit for initiating a revocation action." Ifl. at 
464. In response to the state's concerns regarding violation 
of the public's trust, the court held that "all but technical 
violations can be punished on their own merits and the 
defendant's past record can be considered at that time." Id. 
at 465. 
Furthermore, the court held that the power to revoke 
probation must be exercised within legislatively established 
limits. 
[w]e reaffirm that judges may exercise 
sentencing discretion within those limits 
established by the legislature; the power 
to fix sentencing limits and the power to 
suspend sentence in favor of probation ere 
not inherent In the judiciary but must be 
authorised by statute. 
Id. at 464. 
At the time this natter arose, section 77-18-1(10)(c) 
provided the terms for extending probation. 
At any time pijuai to the termination of 
probation the court may, after a hearing 
with proper notice, upon its own motion or 
the motion of the prosecutor, extend 
probation for good cause shown, for one 
additional term of 18 months in felony or 
class A misdemeanor cases or six months in 
class B misdemeanor cases. The reasons 
for the extension of the probation period 
shall be made a part of the court record. 
(Emphasis added.)2 Defendant served eighteen months of 
incident-free probation. It was jifjLfiX this term of eighteen 
months that the court held a hearing and determined that 
defendant's probation should be revoked. 
After reviewing' the record, it appears that the trial 
court may have intended to sentence defendant to two 
consecutive terms of probation lasting eighteen months each. 
At the hearing on the motion to terminate defendant's 
probation, held approximately two years after the probation 
order went into effect, the court stated *[t]he eighteen months 
probation was imposed on each felony to run consecutively.• 
However, neither the verbal nor the written judgment made 
any mention of two consecutive terms. Rather, the order 
unequivocally stated: "IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the 
Defendant, Leon Earl Denney, be placed on probation for a 
period of three (3) years from and after March 20, 1986." 
2. This section now reads: 
At any time prior to the termination of 
probation, upon a minimum of five days' 
notice and a hearing or upon a waiver of 
the notice and hearing by the probationer, 
the court may extend probation for an 
additional term of 18 months in felony or 
class A misdemeanors or six months in 
class B misdemeanors if fines or 
restitution or both are owing. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(7)(c) (Supp. 1988). 
An unambiguous order made in a criminal proceeding cannot 
be varied by remarks made in a later hearing to coincide with 
what the judge may have intended. 'Where the language of a 
judgment is clear and unambiguous, it must be given effect as 
it is written • • . .• State v. Garcia, 99 N.M. App. 466, 659 
P.2d 918, 923 (1983). It is necessary that sentences be 
rendered with clarity and accuracy in order to avoid the 
possibility of confusion and injustice, phase v. State, 479 
P.2d 337, 339 (Alaska 1971). 
Broad and uniform recognition has been 
given to the precept that a sentence 
imposed by a court acting in a criminal 
case should be definite, unequivocal and 
unambiguous, so that both the defendant 
and the officials charged with executing 
the sentence will be fairly apprised of 
the intentions of the court. 
111. (footnote omitted). This principle was first articulated 
by the United States Supreme Court in United States v. 
Dauqherty, 269 U.S. 360, 363 (1926), where the Court held that 
•[s]entences in criminal cases should reveal with fair 
certainty the intent of the court and exclude any serious 
misapprehensions by those who must execute them.* However, 
"where the meaning is ambiguous, the pleadings and other 
documents of record may be reviewed for purposes of construing 
the meaning of the judgment." Garcia, 659 P.2d at 923. 
The order, as written and pronounced, sentenced the 
defendant to three years of probation. The judge did not state 
in his order that the term of three years was actually two 
consecutive terms of eighteen months each.3 Although, the 
judge may have intended the terms to run consecutively, we do 
not examine his intent where the written order is unequivocal. 
Because the term of probation automatically terminated 
after eighteen months, we do not reach the merits of the waiver 
and estoppel argument. 
3. We do not reach the merits of whether the judge may 
sentence a defendant to two consecutive terms of probation 
under Utah Code Ann. | 76-3-201(1) (Supp. 1988). 
The judgment is reversed with directions to grant the 
laotion nunc £X£ tunc terminating promption. 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
Signal W. Garff, Judg 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
ADDENDUM B 
DEPENSE COPNSEL'S RECOMMENDATION 
One (1) year in the Iron County Jail; 
A fine of $2,000.00 to be paid within the one year; 
A work release from the Jail, from 6:00 A.M. until 
8:00 P.M., to work and support himself and his family; 
Payment of $50.00 per month for his housing in the jail 
negating any expense to the State; 
Mr. Denney to initiate Drug Abuse treatment, at his own 
expense; and 
Mr. Denney to be under strictly supervised probation 
for a period three (3) years. 
ADDENDUM C 
IRON COUNTY 
A?r 201938 
COUNTY OF IRON, STATE OF UTAH ~ . , * , , , , 
************ &JitUsA~ytf\<r*rr< ofPu Y 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LEON EARL DENNY 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
CASE NO. 1027 
Defendant. 
************ 
Upon reading the affidavit of J Lowe Barton, Probation Offiaer for Adult 
Probation and Parole, of the State of Utah, asking that an Order to Show cause 
be issued as to why the above-named Defandant should not have his probation 
revoked and forthwith be corTmitted to the Utah State Prison. 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Defendant, named, be 
ordered and required to appear before the Honorable J. Philip Eves, Judge of 
the Fifth District Court at his courtroom located at 68 South 100 East, 
Parowan, Utah, at the hour of 9 ce AP) on the )^tk day 
of Ap/j ) 9 1988, then and there to show cause, if any, why the 
probation of said Defendant should not be revoked by the Oourt and why the 
said Defendant should not be forthwith committed to the Utah State Prison. 
The Defendant is specifically informed, by this Order, that he has the right 
to be represented by counsel at the time of hearing; and if said Defendant 
cannot afford counsel, one shall be appointed for him by the Oourt. Moreover, 
the Defendant is specifically informed that he has the right to present 
evidence at the hearing. 
DATED THIS \2-V* DAY OF cud! . 1988. 
OG2 
COUtm OF IRON, STATE OF UTAH 
AFFIDAVIT 
Case No.: 1027 
State of Utah 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
Leon Denny 
Defendant 
********** 
STATE OF UTAH SS. 
J Lowe Barton, being first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes and says: That he 
is a District Agent for the Adult Probation and Parole Department; that on the 
eighteenth day of September 1985 the above defendant was found guilty by jury 
(or pleaded guilty) in the above court of (or to) the crime of Uttering a 
forged prescription, a third degree felony and on March 20, 1986 was sentenced 
to the term of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison for said crime; 
Stay of execution was granted and the defendant was placed on probation 
for a period of three years commencing on March 20, 1986. He was further 
ordered to enter into and abide by the conditions set forth in the Probation 
Agreement, a copy of which is attached. 
Itiat the defendant did violate the terms and conditions of his probation 
as follows, to-wit: 
ALLEGATION #1: It is alleged that Mr. Denny is in violation of Condition 5 of 
the Adult Probation t Parole Agreement, to-wit: 5 *I shall 
obey all local, state and federal laws and municipal 
ordinances at all times. I shall report any arrests or 
citations to the Department of Corrections within 72 hours of 
occurrence*; in that, on February 5, 1988 Mr. Denny entered a 
plea of no contest to the charge of D.U.I, in Tonopah, 
Nevada. A $650 fine was imposed. Mr. Denny was ordered to 
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DENNY, LEON EARL 
ALLEGATION #2: It is alleged that Mr. Denny is in violation of Condition 5 of 
the Adult Probation t Parole Agreement, to-wit: 5 "I shall 
obey all state and federal laws and municipal ordinances at 
all times. I shall report any arrests or citations to the 
Department of Corrections within 72 hours"; in that, on March 
28, 1988 Mr. Denny was found to be in possession of two 
financial transaction cards. One with the name Leon C. 
Denning the other with the name L.C. Denning. At the time the 
search of the residence was conducted on March 25, 1988 
receipts indicating the use of these financial transaction 
cards were found in Mr. Denny's business records. It should 
be noted that the names appearing on the financial transaction 
cards are aliases previously known to have been used by Mr. 
Denny. Possession of these cards is in violation of Utah Code 
76-6-506.1 and 76-6-506.2. 
ALLEGATION #3: It is alleged that Mr. Denny is violation Condition 5 of the 
Adult Probation & Parole Agreement, to-wit: 5 "I shall obey 
all state and federal laws and municipal ordinances at all 
times. I shall report any arrests or citations to the 
Department of Corrections within 72 hours of occurrence." in 
that, at the time Mr. Denny was cited for the D.U.I, noted 
above, he did not report the arrest to the Office of Adult 
Probation fc Parole within 72 hours of occurrence. 
Investigating the situation it was also learned that Mr. Denny 
was cited for a second D.U.I, offense in September of 1987. 
However, this was later dismissed but was never reported to 
the Office of Adult Probation t Parole in the 72 hour limit as 
specified in the A&Jlt Probation & parole Agreement. 
06* 
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DENNY, LEON EARL 
WHEREFORE, your af f iant prays tha t an order of the Oourt issue d i rec t ing 
and requir ing the defendant, above named, to be and appear before said Oourt 
to show cause, if any he has why the aforesaid period of probation should not 
be revoked, and why said defendant should not be forthwith oomnitted to the 
Utah State Pr ison. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me 
this / ^ y " " ' day of flfr'C' , 1988. 
Notary residing at : Cedar City, UT 84720 
My commission expires: Vr£ /f /9?c* 
apw 
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